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QUARANTINE REVISION AND THE MODEL
STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT:
"LAWS FOR THE COMMON GOOD"*
Lorena Matei"
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2001, The Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies hosted an indoor war game entitled DARK WINTER.' It was
structured as a series of mock meetings of the National Security
Council to evaluate the response of senior officials to a bioterrorist-
induced national security crisis.2 The participants were twelve former
government officials, five representatives from the media, and fifty
individuals with policy or operational responsibilities related to
biological weapons. 3 The two-day exercise simulated a period of two
weeks, during which an outbreak of smallpox in an American city
spread to twenty-five states and fifteen other countries.4 By the end
of the simulated two weeks, the number of smallpox cases had risen
to 16,000 in twenty-five states, with 1,000 deaths in the U.S. alone.5
Key lessons learned from the DARK WINTER exercise included:
1. Leaders are unfamiliar with the character of bioterrorist
attacks, available policy options and their consequences
* The title makes reference to Justice Harlan's opinion in the Supreme Court case of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S 11 (1905).
t B.S., Biology, University of California, San Diego, 1998; J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara
University School of Law, 2002. The author would very much like to thank Gerry Elman, of
this Journal's Board of Advisors, for his suggestion of this topic as one that would be timely and
appropriate, for his assistance in researching this issue, and for his review of early drafts of this
Case Note.
1. Tara O'Toole & Thomas Inglesby, Shining Light on Dark Winter, at
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/lessons.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
2. CTR. FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, JOHNS HOPKINS U., DARK WINTER: A
BIOTERRORISM EXERCISE, at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/darkwinter.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter JOHNS HOPKINS DARK WINTER REPORT].
3. O'Toole, supra note I.
4. JOHNS HOPKINS DARK WINTER REPORT, supra note 2.
5. O'Toole, supra note I.
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2. Following a bioterrorist attack, leaders' key decisions would
depend on data and expertise from medical and public health
sectors
3. The lack of sufficient vaccine or drugs to prevent the spread
of disease severely limited management options
4. The U.S. health care system lacks the surge capacity to deal
with mass casualties
5. To end a disease outbreak after a bioterrorist attack,
decision-makers will require ongoing expert advice from
senior public health and medical leaders
6. Federal and state priorities may be unclear, differ or conflict,
authorities may be uncertain, and constitutional issues may
arise
7. The individual actions of US citizens will be critical in
ending the spread of contagious disease - leaders must gain
the trust and sustained cooperation of the American people.6
The DARK WINTER exercise was a hypothetical example of a
public health emergency. It highlighted the precarious nature of an
adequate emergency response. The United States government faces
numerous deficiencies regarding national security. Those learning its
lessons realize that current public health models must be reevaluated
to establish concrete standards of efficient response to a medical
health crisis. Furthermore, since the events of September 11, 2001,
bioterrorism has been more than a hypothetical danger; it is a realistic
threat, not only to the United States, but also to the entire world.
In response to growing fears of a bioterrorist attack, federal
health officials and state legislatures across the country have proposed
new laws. Taking the lead, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC") in Atlanta has drafted a model act, 7 premised on
the idea that existing state laws are inadequate to confront a
bioterrorism event, and should be supplemented with a more
comprehensive plan that will avoid conflicts with state laws. That
act, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA" or
the "Model Act"), 8 clarifies a government's responsibility to protect
its citizens from the threat of bioterrorism.
6. Id.
7. A model act is one to which state legislatures refer, and from which they draw, in
drafting and adopting their own legislative provisions.
8. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
2002] MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 435
Formulation of the MSEHPA has been a cooperative effort
between the Center for Law and the Public's Health, at Georgetown
and Johns Hopkins Universities, and the CDC. For assistance in the
initial brainstorming effort, these organizations also turned to the
National Governors Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials,
the National Association of City and County Health Officials, and the
National Association of Attorneys General.
The Model Act provides an inclusive plan that would
concentrate power in state health officials, in cooperation with state
governors. The Act seeks to deal with the issue of bioterrorism in the
context of a public health emergency. It takes into account various
dangers, "including emergent and resurgent infectious diseases and
incidents of civilian mass casualties." 9 As proposed, the MSEHPA
would permit a governor to declare a state of emergency if there is
imminent threat of epidemic, or any illness as a result of biological
warfare.
Although the MSEHPA seeks to ensure a "strong, effective, and
timely response to public health emergencies, while fostering respect
for individuals from all groups and backgrounds,"10 many state
political leaders and health officials criticize aspects of the Model Act
for placing excessive restraints on individual freedoms, which would
result from the sweeping government control it would grant to state
officials. One area of concern, in particular, is the provision
regarding isolation and quarantine of individuals or groups of
individuals.'1 Although quarantines have been applied on occasion in
limited circumstances,' 2 broad quarantines have never been used in
the United States; they raise political and ethical questions in a mobile
society.1 3  Furthermore, current state quarantine powers "'mostly
predate new findings in the public health sciences and constitutional
law and civil liberties, so that they likely would be challenged (in
court),' said Lawrence Gostin, a law professor at Georgetown
University Law Center in Washington and an expert in public health
9. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl. (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001).
10. Id.
11. Id. art. VI, § 604.
12. See generally HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE!: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH
IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892 (1997).
13. Seth Borenstein, Vast quarantine role advocated for states, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Nov. 7, 2001, available at http://www.freep.com/news/nw/terror2001/quar7 20011107.htm.
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law."' 14 Professor Gostin, who worked on drafting the Model Act,
claims that the current laws use language that is too general and is not
specific as to protecting the health of those who are quarantined.15 "'I
think it would be a recipe for chaos. It needs to be much better
planned, and the powers need to be well-tailored to modem health
threats,' Gostin said."' 16  This is exactly what Professor Gostin
attempted to do when drafting the MSEHPA. Whether his vision is
realized in the form of workable legislation remains to be seen.
In analyzing the quarantine provisions of the MSEHPA, this
Case Note first reviews the text of the entire proposal, starting with
the purpose and the legislative intent. From there, the Note looks at
the specifics of article VI: Special Powers During State of Public
Health Emergency: Protection of Persons. Finally, the balance of this
Note assesses how the principles presented in the Model Act would
square with basic constitutional law. There is strong and resonant
opposition to the Model Act for reasons of public concern.
Americans want their health to be protected, but will not permit their
civil liberties to be compromised. Is this a realistic goal? Does the
Model Act appropriately account for restrictions on freedom? As
Thomas Jefferson said, "[l]aws abridging the natural right of the
citizen should be restrained by rigorous constructions within their
narrowest limits.' 7 It remains to be seen how narrow those limits can
remain at the start of the twenty-first century, in the aftermath of
September 11, in a world threatened by terror.
II. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT:
AN OVERVIEW
The MSEHPA is a proposal that addresses emergency health
threats, including those caused by terrorism. Its first draft was the
work of Lawrence Gostin, initiated at the request of the CDC during
the anthrax scare that followed the September 11 attacks.' 8  The
proposal was distributed to states in late October with the support of
14. Bruce Hight, 21st Century Quarantine Calls for New Rules, NEW YORK TIMES:
YOUR HEALTH DAILY, Nov. 5, 2001, at
http://199.97.97.16/contWriter/yhdweek/2001/11/06/medic/5390-0044-pat nytimes.html.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in 13
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 327 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds.,
1903-04), available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0150.htm.
18. See Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 19,
2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 30326725.
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Tommy G. Thompson, secretary of the U.S. Health and Human
Services Department, who said at the time, "We need not only a
strong health infrastructure and a full stockpile of medical resources,
but also the legal and emergency tools to help our citizens quickly."' 19
The Model Act addresses a "renewed focus on the prevention,
detection, management, and containment of public health
emergencies, 20 and is a direct response to the events of September
11. The possibility of a bioterrorist attack using a deadly and
contagious disease-such as smallpox-is no longer a hypothetical
threat, but a realistic eventuality. In response, public health officials
want the power to take measures to ensure public safety.
A basic overview of the Model Act finds that it would give an
adopting state the responsibility for safeguarding its public health and
security, requiring it to respond quickly and efficiently to any "public
health emergency."'', The MSEHPA lists the duties and powers to be
delegated to state officials responsible for gathering intelligence and
meeting threats to public health22 and also provides limits on those
powers to prevent the violation of civil liberties.2 3 Of course, it is
expected that the Model Act may be modified and amended by
individual state legislatures in the course of adoption.
A. Declaration of Emergency
The MSEHPA provides state and local officials with the power
to detect, prevent and control any emergency health threats by
developing a plan to provide an appropriate response to these health
24
situations. For example, "[d]uring a public health emergency, state
and local officials are authorized to use and appropriate property as
necessary for the care, treatment, and housing of patients, and to
destroy contaminated facilities or materials. They are also
empowered to provide care, testing and treatment, and vaccination to
persons who are ill or who have been exposed to a contagious disease,
and to separate affected individuals from the population at large to
interrupt disease transmission., 25 The Model Act defines a "public
health emergency" as:
19. Id.
20. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl. (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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[A]n occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health
condition that:
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following:
(i) bioterrorism;
(ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled
or eradicated infections agent or biological toxin;
(iii) [a natural disaster;]
(iv) [a chemical attack or accidental release; or]
(v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms:
(i) a large number of deaths in the affected population;
(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in
the affected population; or
(iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent
that poses a significant risk of substantial future
harm to a large number of people in the affected
population.26
The Model Act would give extraordinary powers to the governor
in the case of a public health emergency. Under the proposal, "when
the situation calls for prompt and timely action," a governor has the
discretionary power to declare a state of public health emergency
without consulting public health officials.2 7 The state's public health
authority "and other affected agencies shall have the power to enforce
the provisions of [the] Act through the imposition of fines and
penalties, the issuance of orders, and such other remedies as are
provided by law., 28 The language of the Model Act seems to give
unabridged police power to a state's executive branch, including its
public health authority, not only to declare a state of emergency, but
also to enforce any provisions listed via any means deemed necessary.
These expansive powers have raised concerns. Not only are they
broad, but also they are ambiguous. Although the term is defined,
there is no precise articulation of what would constitute a public
health emergency. The proposed language is too broad and uses
speculative terms such as "it is believed" as well as "significant" and
"substantial," which are dependent on subjective evaluation. In
addition, the Act provides for its enforcement by "other affected
agencies" without defining those agencies or the scope of their
26. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. 1, § 104(m) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2001) (emphasis in original).
27. ld. art. IV, § 401.
28. See id. art. VIII, § 802.
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enforcement power.2 9 It would be wise if states, when adopting the
MSEHPA in whole or in part, define "public health emergency" and
"other affected agencies" using objective criteria.
It should also be noted that the Model Act does not contain
provisions for immediate judicial or legislative review of an
30
emergency declaration. While there exists automatic termination
after 30 days unless renewed by the Governor, the State Legislature
can only terminate a declaration by a majority vote in both chambers;
this is contingent upon finding that the "occurrence of an illness or
health condition that caused the emergency does not or no longer
poses a high probability of a large number of deaths in the affected
population.,
31
B. Civil Liberties
It is also the responsibility of the MSEHPA to provide for
individual civil liberties. While the Model Act is designed to promote
the common good through the exercise of emergency powers, it must
nonetheless be guided by the principles of dignity and respect of the
rights of persons. It is an ambitious task to balance the modernization
of public health laws in the anticipation of a public health emergency
with the seminal constitutional covenant of civil liberties.
Accordingly, the Model Act provides that, "in the event of the
exercise of emergency powers, the civil rights, liberties, and needs of
infected or exposed persons will be protected to the fullest extent
possible consistent with the primary goal of controlling serious health
threats. 32 What exactly, though, do these qualitative terms mean?
For example, who determines the extent of possibility for protection?
In addition, there are various groups within the population whose
members have religious beliefs that prohibit them to take medication,
including, but not limited to, vaccination. Under the Model Act, the
only alternative to vaccination is quarantine.3 3 States looking to
incorporate the MSEHPA should consider offering other alternatives
to mandatory vaccinations or quarantine; failure to do so would be to
ignore these individuals' assertion of their fundamental rights.
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
31. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. IV, § 405(a) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2001).
32. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
33. See id. art. VI, § 603(a)(3).
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To protect civil liberties, the MSEHPA attempts to place certain
limits on state emergency powers using broad procedural safeguards,
including a requirement that authorities present evidence and obtain
court orders before instituting most mandatory measures, such as
34long-term quarantine with notice. Owners whose facilities or
materials were taken would be entitled to compensation in some
circumstances, but not in all. In addition, these powers would only
be used in case of an emergency that threatened the lives of a large
number of Americans. The scenario cited is an outbreak of smallpox,
31
which, if uncontrolled, could kill a third of the world's population.
III. ARTICLE VI: SPECIAL POWERS DURING A STATE OF
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY: PROTECTION OF
PERSONS
While these provisions may appear to be a protection of liberties,
section 605(a)(1) of article VI, which as whole merits further scrutiny,
grants authorization to the public health authority to "temporarily
isolate or quarantine an individual or groups of individuals through
written directive if delay in imposing the isolation or quarantine
would significantly jeopardize the public health authority's ability to
prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly
contagious disease to others. 3 7  The procedures for isolation and
quarantine are broad, and while they do offer certain protections, they
appear to favor the complete discretion of the subjective judgment of
the public health authority.
Section 601 states that "[d]uring a state of public health
emergency, the public health authority shall use every available
means to prevent the transmission of infectious disease and to ensure
that all cases of contagious disease are subject to proper control and
treatment., 38 This extends to powers delegated to the public health
authority to isolate and quarantine an individual or groups of
individuals who have not been "vaccinated, treated, tested, or
examined pursuant to Sections 602 and 603."39 The purpose behind
the isolation and quarantine provisions is to prevent the spread of
34. See id. art. VI, §§ 604-605.
35. See id. art. V, § 506.
36. See Gillis, supra note 18.
37. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VI, § 605(a)(1) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2001).
38. Id. art. VI, § 601 (text of the section adapted from CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
120575 (West 1996)).
39. Id. art. VI, § 604(a).
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contagious or possibly contagious disease. If individuals are not
willing to cooperate with these provisions they shall be liable for a
misdemeanor.40 Is the common good served when citizens are facing
criminal penalties and state police or the National Guard is enforcing
measures at gunpoint, if necessary?
Although the Model Act does provide a form of due process in
that the health authority may first obtain a written, ex parte order from
a state court authorizing an action of isolation and quarantine,4' the
public health authority may proceed with the quarantine if any delay
in the procedure would pose an immediate threat to the public
health.42 Under the Model Act, a quarantined or isolated person also
has the right to a court hearing in order to contest the order. The court
shall grant the petition only if "by a preponderance of the evidence,
isolation or quarantine is shown to be reasonably necessary to prevent
or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly contagious
disease to others. '' 3
Although the Model Act directs state officials to use the "least
restrictive means necessary'" 4 to control a germ from spreading, there
are numerous logistical and ethical questions that arise as a result of
these broad powers. Health officials say there is a positive shift in the
purpose of quarantine, by focusing on the care of quarantined
individuals rather than on isolating them from the general
population.45 The provisions of the MSEHPA are specific in dealing
with the treatment of isolated individuals. Section 604 specifies,
"[t]he health status of isolated and quarantined individuals must be
monitored regularly to determine if they require isolation and
quarantine. ' ,46 Furthermore, "[i]solated and quarantined individuals
must be immediately released when they pose no substantial risk of
transmitting a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others.
'47
More important, "[t]he needs of persons isolated and quarantined
shall be addressed in a systematic and competent fashion, including
40. Id. art. VI, § 604(c).
41. Id. art. VI. § 605(b).
42. Id.
43. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VI, § 605(b)(5) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2001).
44. Id. art. VI, § 604(b)(1).
45. Bioterror Raises Talk of Quarantines, ABCNEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2002, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/homefront020128.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2002).
46. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VI, § 604(b)(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2001).
47. Id. art. VI, § 604(b)(5).
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but not limited to, providing adequate food, clothing, shelter, means
of communication with those in isolation or quarantine and outside
settings, medication, and competent medical care."
48
While this appears to be a reasonable means of controlling an
infected population, there remains uncertainty and ambiguity
regarding quarantine. For example, how far would officials go to
keep people out of the quarantined area? What means would they
use? Would armed guards have to be posted outside, ready to use live
ammunition to prevent trespassing? Could parents be kept from their
children? How would the medical personnel and armed guards be
protected from becoming ill themselves? How would the provisions
of section 604 (i.e., food, clothing, etc.) be enforced without exposing
others to germs? What is the most efficient/economical way to treat
these individuals? These are just some of the concerns not addressed
by the MSEHPA, but very real to those who may be potentially
affected by the new quarantine laws.
Additionally, should a protest be brought before a court, the
justice system appears ill prepared to handle the situation. "We've
never done it in modern times, so nobody knows," said Douglas
Laycock, a law professor at the University of Texas and a nationally
recognized expert in constitutional law.49 "Anyone who tells you they
know what the courts would say about this is blowing smoke."5°
Laycock says it is likely the courts would defer to medical opinion in
questions regarding quarantine.51 "If the medical testimony is that (an
area quarantine) will really work, this will save a lot of lives in the
rest of the city, and there's no other way to do that, then I think courts
probably should uphold it," he said.
52
In addition to concerns over judicial procedures, there is the
practical aspect of quarantines. Will they really work? Will large-
scale quarantines ever be needed? What will happen if a germ is
released into the air? Infected individuals will still need to be
isolated, but the logistics of isolations need to be worked out. It is
one thing to isolate an area, but a different thing altogether to impose
quarantines on people. According to the MSEHPA, individuals need
not even be sick to be quarantined.53 It is enough that health officials
48. Id. art. VI, § 604(b)(6).
49. Hight, supra note 14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (alteration in original).
53. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VI, § 604(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2001).
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have "reasonable cause to believe that an individual is ill with, has
been exposed to, or is the carrier of a communicable disease., 54 This
is an open-ended proposal to isolate a large number of individuals
based upon the mere speculation that there has been exposure to a
contagion. Certainly Americans will not accept being herded into
quarantine en masse.
There are alternatives to the camp-like quarantines envisioned in
the MSEHPA. Rather than mass isolation, a more useful method of
prevention would be community education, which would teach people
when they should stay home or seek medical assistance.55 In addition,
there should be a trend toward more training of emergency personnel,
who would be able to treat an infected population on site, rather than
56
setting up a quarantine camp.
Many health activists fear that the resurrection of quarantines
raises serious concerns about civil liberties. They point to past uses,
or rather misuses, of quarantines, which have not been used on a large
scale in the U.S. in more than eighty years.57 In the past there has
been an uneven application of quarantine provisions. For example,
when a cholera outbreak was reported in 1892 on a ship in New York
Harbor, the Port Authority isolated only poor immigrants in
unsanitary conditions; fifty-eight died.58 In 1900, a quarantine in San
Francisco, triggered by the bubonic plague, applied only to Chinese
businesses and homes. 59 Granted we live in the year 2002, not 1892,
but there is still the potential for abuse regarding the new law. "It is a
recipe for discriminatory application," says Donna Lieberman,
executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union.6 °
Lieberman refers in particular to the section of the proposed law that
allows a broad quarantine of "individuals or groups" who have not
been vaccinated, treated, or tested. "We are concerned that the
emergency powers will be used to target minority groups, whether
54. Hight, supra note 14.
55. See Jennifer King, Power Grab: The States in a State of Emergency. The Model
Emergency Health Powers Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, Jan. 2002, at
http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/0202.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2002).
56. See id.
57. See Sharon Lerner, Round Up the Unusual Suspects, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 2-8, 2002,
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0201/lerner.php and 2002 WL 12930036. See
also MARKEL, supra note 12.
58. Lerner, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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they be gays or people of color or those perceived to be most at risk
of infection. 61
The MSEHPA has been criticized not only by civil libertarians,
but also by the drafter himself. "It is probable that a population
exposed to a biological weapon will have dispersed well beyond any
easily definable geographic boundaries before the infection becomes
manifest and any disease containment measures can be initiated,"
Gostin stated in a recent issue of the Journal of the American Medical
Association.
62
Regardless of the criticisms and concerns, the MSEHPA appears
to have strong support, including the backing of the Bush
Administration.63 It has been distributed to all states and has been
given careful scrutiny by governors around the country. Several
states are trying to consider the new legislative proposal in the context
of their existing laws. "It's a very useful road map. It addresses all
the issues," said Maryland State Senator Brian E. Frosh.64 "I'm not
sure yet that it's the right [plan] for Maryland. 6 5 Frosh shares the
concerns of many others regarding the impact on individual civil
liberties. "We want to make sure we're not running roughshod over
people's individual rights," said Frosh.66 His response and concerns
echo those of most state representatives.6 7 While there is a great need
to revise current emergency health laws, the MSEHPA is not
designed to be implemented without debate, scrutiny, and potential
revision. "This [model bill] is meant for state legislators, governors
and others to use as a tool, as an ideal piece of legislation - which we
think it might be," said Lisa Speissegger, a public health adviser to
the National Conference for Legislatures, a partner in developing the
model legislation. 68 "Our intent was for them to look at it and say,
'OK, what things don't we have in our law',
69
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See James L. Thorne, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act - Will it
Become Law?, AM. ACAD. EMERGENCY MED, at
http://www.aaem.org/disasterresponse/modelstate.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
64. Nora Achrati, Maryland Lawmakers Take a Careful Approach to Health Emergency
Law, DAILY REC. (Md.), Nov. 7, 2001, available at
http://www.vaccinationnews.com/Dailynews/November/ 202001/MarylandLawmakersCareful
Approach.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
65. Id. (alteration in original).
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. (alteration in original).
69. Id.
2002] MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 445
In particular, this is an excellent opportunity for states to revise
current quarantine tactics. Sobered by the events of September 11,
and the subsequent anthrax alarm, state officials are now in a position
to revisit existing legislation. Does it still serve the public effectively
in a climate of bioterrorism? Health leaders need to evaluate the
potential of a widespread emergency, such as smallpox, and the
response that such an emergency would, and should, trigger.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT
It is safe to say that most people support the overall objective of
ensuring the protection of public health. Following the events of
September 11, our nation's health officials have rightly turned their
attention to achieving this goal. Responding to the situation
surrounding the terrorist attacks and the discovery of anthrax, the
Center for Disease Control released the MSEHPA as a guide to help
states adopt laws to adequately respond to potential bioterrorist
attacks such as smallpox.
However, there remains a significant amount of controversy
surrounding the proposed Act. Many oppose the sweeping powers
the Model Act delegates to state governors. The model law "puts the
lives of an entire state in the hands of one person who may or may not
rise to the occasion," says Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George
Washington University. 70  "A state may be cursed with some
dimwit."'"
Some argue that there is no need for the governor to have the
level of emergency powers contemplated by the proposal. Governors
already have sufficient powers to operate effectively in a state of
emergency. Furthermore, time has shown that under extraordinary
72circumstances governors have "bent the law" in response. As Dr.Glueck and Dr. Cihak explain, "We're not against a little creative
70. Sarah Lueck, States Seek to Strengthen Emergency Powers: Movement Is Raising
Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A26, available at 2002
WL-WSJ 3382169 and http://www.alec.org/viewpage.cftn?pgname=1.216 (last visited Mar. 19,
2002).
71. Id.
72. See Michael A. Glueck & Robert J. Cihak, Emergency Health Powers Proposal: A
Poison Pill, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Jan. 2000, at
http://www.heartland.org/health/jan02/poison.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2002). Michael A.
Glueck, MD writes extensively on medical, legal disability, and mental health reform. Robert J.
Cihak, MD is the immediate past president of the Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons (AAPS). Id.
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interpretation, should a compelling need arise. What we're against is
'stockpiling' of excessive law and regulation. 7 3
In addition, the question of liability should be addressed since
section 804 of the Model Act declares, "neither the State, its political
subdivisions, nor except in cases of gross negligence or willful
misconduct, the Governor, the public health authority, or any other
State or local official referenced in this Act, is liable for the death of
or any injury to persons... as a result of complying with or
attempting to comply with this Act .... While the Model Act
delegates substantial powers to state officials, it does not appear to
provide for the accountability of those individuals. "Gross
negligence" and "willful misconduct" are high thresholds, which
appear to be legal protections for the actions of any officials
promulgating the regulations of the Model Act. This is clearly
another provision that should be given careful scrutiny before
adoption.
A recent conference at the University of Minnesota addressed
some of the recent concerns that have been expressed regarding the
MSEHPA.75 Lawrence Gostin defended the model law and spoke
about the ailing public health system. He emphasized the fear of a
potential biological attack and the importance of an effective
emergency response. He called last fall's anthrax attacks "a very
tragic dry run," in which bioterrorists used "an incredibly effective
bullet... [but] a very ineffective gun.",76 "Make no mistake about it,
it will happen again," said bioterrorism expert Michael T. Osterholm,
Ph.D.77 Gostin further emphasizes the need for a renewed public
health infrastructure.78 Our current systems are not only ill equipped
to deal with a massive public health emergency, but they are also
inconsistent. The laws differ from state to state. "In some cases the
73. Id.
74. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VIII, § 804(a) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2001).
75. Symposium, The Law and Ethics of Public Health Responses to Bioterrorism, U.
MINN. CONSORTIUM ON LAW & VALUES 1N HEALTH, ENV'T, & LIFE SCIENCES (Jan. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.lifesci.consortium.umn.edu/conferences/bioterrorism.php (last visited
Mar. 20, 2002).
76. Robert Roos, State Health Emergency Laws Aren't Ready for Bioterrorism, Says
Expert, U. MINN. CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL'Y, Jan. 30, 2002, at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bioprep/news/gostin013002.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2002).
77. Id. Dr. Osterholm is the director of the University of Minnesota's Center for
Infectious Disease Research & Policy.
78. See id.
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power is too draconian, in other cases the power doesn't exist," he
said.79 The MSEHPA seeks uniformity and offers a proposal to
achieve it.
In defense of the criticized provisions of the Model Act, Gostin
offers a response, in particular to the section titled "Protection of
Persons." Gostin acknowledges that the idea of required vaccination,
isolation, and quarantine is controversial.80 However, he does not
foresee the necessity of the use of force, nor a large-scale resistance to
the proposed procedures. "We do anticipate that the use of coercion
would be minimal, because most people would want to cooperate for
the sake of their health. 81 He contends that the power of quarantine
would be used lightly, but stresses that "nobody could doubt that the
public health authority needs the power to quarantine. If somebody
had smallpox and insisted on congregating, it would be insane not to
quarantine."
82
Furthermore, the lessons of DARK WINTER still resonate. The
fictional scenario was a proverbial wake-up call to our nation's
leaders. The U.S. is not prepared to deal with a large-scale outbreak;
existing response plans are inadequate for a biological warfare event.
Some highlights of the exercise were focal points in the reevaluation
of current emergency response plans. DARK WINTER emphasized
the fact that a biological warfare attack could potentially cripple the
country. America currently lacks the stockpiles necessary for an
appropriate response.83 More important, forcible constraint may be
the only means available when vaccine stocks are depleted.84 These
key issues are only compounded by the reality that the Government
lacks coherent decision-making processes and protocols. 85 This is a
severe handicap to national security, and one that must be addressed
and ameliorated. The MSEHPA proposes to do just that.
Despite the criticism, the model legislation has been introduced
for consideration in most states. Thirty-four states, including
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Roos, supra note 76.
83. JoHNS HOPKINS DARK WINTER REPORT, supra note 2. This includes vaccines,
antibiotics and an effective means of distribution.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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California,8 6 have already introduced legislation based upon the
Model Act.87 In addition, legislative and executive branch officials in
six more states are reviewing the MSEHPA and considering their
responses to it.
88
Will The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act become
law? Numerous questions arise, the answers to which are not readily
available. The MSEHPA does not address the diversity of state
government structure as well as state constitutional law. State law,
rather than federal law, has traditionally governed public health. This
includes state constitutions, court precedent, and the individual
political environment of each respective state. If the MSEHPA were
enacted without amendment, there would in many instances be
significant conflict with current state provisions. The reality is that
something like the MSEHPA is called for in our current political and
social circumstances. Each individual state, though, should develop
its own plan based upon the principles enunciated by the Model Act.
The MSEHPA should be used as an introduction to the issues and a
template for states to compare existing authority with the proposals
presented. If used appropriately, the Model Act may be an excellent
vehicle to state law reform. Nevertheless, it is essential that state
legislatures avoid taking the Model Act "as is" and push it through
without regard for the conflicts inherently present, as well as the
strong concerns that have been voiced by members of the American
public.
Although few states will adopt the model, as is, without
considering amendments to the draft, preliminary analysis shows that
states are in support of the proposal. 89 Regardless of the variations
being considered, state lawmakers will be forced to face the issue of
balancing civil liberties and emergency health powers. 90 The Model
Act itself tries to reach this balance, making it a declared goal. It
quotes Justice Harlan in the Supreme Court case of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,91 who wrote, "the whole people covenants with each
86. See A.B. 1763, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1763 bill_20020108_introduced.pdf
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
87. See VIEW ALEC'S TRACKING OF MEPHA IN THE STATES, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE
COUNCIL, at http://www.alec.org/viewpage.cfin?pgname=5.103 (last visited Apr. 26, 2002)
[hereinafter TRACKING OF MEPHA]. The graph illustrates the progress of the Model Act.
88. Id.
89. See Appendix, infra.
90. See Gillis, supra note 18.
91. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
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citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that shall be governed
by certain laws for the common good.,
92
92. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl. (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001).
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APPENDIX
In the following table, "Status of the MSEHPA" refers to the
progress of the Model Act in the specified states:9
3
State Status of the MSEHPA
Arizona Senate Bill 1400; 04/03/2002 Having passed the Senate,
referred to House Committees on Health, Human Services, and
Rules
California Assembly Bill 1763; 04/22/2002 Having been amended,
passed to Committee on Appropriations
Connecticut House Bill 5286; 04/17/2002 Having been reported favorably
by the Joint Committee on Public Health, and having been
reported out of the Legislative Commissioner's Office, to the
Joint Committee on Public Safety
Delaware House Bill 377; 03/26/2002 Having been reported without
recommendation by the House Committee on Health & Human
Development, to House Committee on Appropriations
Florida House Bill 1579; 03/22/2002 Having been withdrawn from the
House Committee on Judicial Oversight, died in Council for
Healthy Communities
Senate Bill 1262; 03/22/2002 Having passed the Senate and
the House, to enrollment
Senate Bill 1264; 03/22/2002 Having passed the Senate, died
on calendar
Georgia Senate Bill 385; 04/12/2002 Having passed the Senate, and
then the House, Senate concurred in House amendments
Hawaii House Bill 2521; 04/15/2002 Having passed the House, and
then the Senate, House disagreed to Senate amendments; to
Conference Committee.
Senate Bill 2779; 03/18/2002 Having passed the Senate,
amended in the House by the House Committee on Health and
passed to House Committee on Judiciary and Hawaiian Affairs
Idaho House Bill 517; 03/15/2002 Having passed the House,
adjourned by Senate Committee on State Affairs; no carryover
Illinois House Bill 3809; 04/05/2002 Rereferred to House Committee
on Rules
Senate Bill 1529; 11/13/2001 To Senate Committee on Rules
93. See TRACKING OF MEPHA, supra note 87 (following MSEHPA-related activities in
the states).
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State Status of the MSEHPA
Kansas Senate Bill 597; 02/14/2002 To Senate Committee on
Judiciary
Kentucky House Bill 370; 01/17/2002 To House Committee on State
Government
Maine House Paper 1656; 04/11/2002 Having been amended by Joint
Committee on Judiciary, and having passed the House and the
Senate, signed by Governor
Maryland House Bill 296; 04/05/2002 Having passed the House and the
Senate, eligible for Governor's desk
House Bill 303; 04/09/2002 Having passed the House and the
Senate, signed by Governor
Senate Bill 234; 04/09/2002 Having passed the Senate and the
House, signed by Governor
Senate Bill 235; 03/29/2002 Having passed the Senate, passed
the House
Massachusetts Senate Bill 2194; 11/26/2001 To Senate Committee on Ways
and Means
Minnesota House File 2619; 01/29/2002 To House Committee on Health
and Human Services Policy
House File 3031; 04/03/2002 Having passed the House, and
having passed the Senate with amendments, House refused to
concur in Senate amendments; to Conference Committee
Senate File 2669; 03/26/2002 Substituted with House File
3031 on General Orders
Mississippi Senate Bill 2737; 03/05/2002 Having passed the Senate, and
having been referred to the House Committee on
Appropriations, died in committee
House Bill 1348; 01/21/2002 To House Committee on
Appropriations
Missouri House Bill 1771; 02/14/2002 To House Committee on
Children, Families and Health
Senate Bill 712; 02/20/2002 Having passed the Senate, to the
House
Senate Bill 1000; 01/28/2002 To Senate Committee on Public
Health and Welfare
Nebraska Legislative Bill 1224; 04/19/2002 A hearing having been held
on 02/13/2002, Indefinitely Postponed when Legislature
adjourned until 01/08/2003
452 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
State Status of the MSEHPA
Nevada Bill Draft; 03/19/2002 The Interim Legislative Committee on
Health Care met to discuss possible enactment of the Draft State
Emergency Health Powers Act
New Hampshire House Bill 1478; 04/16/2002 Having passed the House, and
having passed with the Senate with amendment, to the House
for concurrence
New Jersey Assembly Bill 4060; 12/20/2001 To Assembly Committee on
Appropriations
New Mexico House Joint Memorial 34; 02/14/2002 Having passed the
House, passed Senate
House Joint Memorial 38; 02/14/2002 Withdrawn from
Senate Committee on Rules
House Joint Memorial 62; 02/13/2002 Having passed the
Senate, passed the House
New York Assembly Bill 9508; 03/05/2002 Amended in Assembly
Committee on Health
Senate Bill 5841; 03/04/2002 Amended in Senate Committee
on Health
Oklahoma House Bill 2765; 04/08/2002 Having passed the House,
amended and reported by Senate Committee on Appropriations;
enacting clause stricken
Pennsylvania House Bill 2261; 01/02/2002 To House Committee on
Veterans Affairs and Emergency Preparedness
Senate Bill 1338; 03/11/2002 Introduced and to Senate
Committee on Public Health and Welfare
Rhode Island House Bill 7305; 04/04/2002 House Committee on Health,
Education and Welfare recommended measure be held for
further study
House Bill 7357; 04/03/2002 House Committee on Health,
Education and Welfare recommended measure be held for
further study
House Bill 7563; 04/10/2002 Scheduled for hearing and/or
consideration
Senate Bill 2304; 01/29/2002 To Senate Committee on Health,
Education and Welfare
Senate Bill 2865; 04/03/2002 Continued by Senate Committee
on Health, Education and Welfare
South Dakota House Bill 1303; 02/27/2002 Having passed the House, and
having passed the Senate with amendment, and the House
having concurred in Senate amendments, signed by Governor
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Tennessee House Bill 2271; 04/10/2002 Substituted on House floor by
Senate Bill 2392
Senate Bill 2392; 04/17/2002 Having passed the Senate, and
having passed the House with amendment, the Senate concurred
in House amendment numbers 1 & 3
Utah House Bill 231; 03/18/2002 Having passed the House and the
Senate, signed by Governor
Vermont Senate Bill 298; 04/18/2002 Having passed the Senate, to the
House Committee on Judiciary
Virginia House Bill 882; 02/08/2002 In House Committee on
Appropriations: If by Dec. 20 the committee has not taken
action on this bill, it will not be considered in 2003 session
Washington House Bill 2854; 03/14/2002 Having passed the House, and
having been passed by the Senate Committee on Health and
Long Term Care, and having been returned to the House Rules
Committee, adjourned; no carryover
Wisconsin Assembly Bill 849; 03/26/2002 Failed to pass in Assembly
Committee on Public Health pursuant to Senate Joint
Resolution 1
Assembly Bill 850; 03/20/2002 Having passed the Assembly,
failed to pass in Senate Committee on Health, Utilities,
Veterans and Military Affairs pursuant to Senate Joint
Resolution I
Wyoming Senate Bill 67; 03/13/2002 Having passed the Senate,
adjourned by House Committee on Minerals, Business and
Economic Development; no carryover
As demonstrated, various states have incorporated parts of the
proposal and have introduced their respective legislation as a
response. Each state has expressed its individual intent to enact
legislation that authorizes respective state departments to respond to a
public health emergency. To see the individual proposals and
suggested amendments to the MSEHPA please review the proposed
measures. They do not reflect the adoption of the MSEHPA as a
whole, but rather the integration of the ideals introduced by the Model
Act.

